The ''mere parchment barriers'' created by constitutional provisions may lead to decreases in the extent to which nations abuse the human right not to be imprisoned, tortured, killed, or made to disappear arbitrarily or because of your political views. A global pooled cross-national time-series analysis for a 21-year period shows that adopting selected constitutional provisions protecting individual rights and freedoms, promoting judicial independence, and guarding against states of emergency-and keeping the provisions in place for 10 years-has the potential to reduce a nation's level of state terror substantially, from one in which political imprisonment affects large numbers of the politically active population and political murders are common, to one where the rule of law is secure, for example. We report significant caveats about and limitations of the research. Nevertheless, we conclude that, since it may be easier to change constitutions than to build effective democracy, to create massive amounts of new wealth, or to avoid or defuse deeply ingrained conflicts, these findings have possible policy and scientific importance.
I
s the law an effective or merely a parchment barrier to human rights abuse? There are few questions that are of greater interest and importance to involved citizens, politicians (statesmen), and scholars. If the law is an effective barrier to human rights abuse (repression), then those who wish to prevent it are well advised to invest their time in establishing the kinds of law that deter it. If the law is no more than a flimsy parchment barrier to rights abuse, then efforts to create legal barriers to repression may be irrelevant: those who wish to prevent human rights abuse should probably concentrate their efforts on other prophylactic measures.
We tackle our title through an empirical analysis. In that analysis, formal constitutional provisions relevant to protecting rights represent the law, and attacks on personal integrity-imprisoning or torturing people, making them disappear, or killing them because of their political views-define human rights abuse. Our analysis is worldwide, cross-national, and cross-time.
The Debate over the Efficacy of Law
Whether the law is or can be an effective barrier to human rights abuse has been debated for centuries.
In the United States, James Madison, who helped shape the U.S. Constitution and introduced its Bill of Rights into Congress, was remarkably ambivalent about the effectiveness of such ''parchment'' barriers against abuses of power. Assessing the U.S. Constitution's provisions for the separation of powers, Madison wondered ''Will it be sufficient to mark with precision the boundaries of these departments in the Constitution of the government, and to trust to these parchment barriers against the encroaching spirit of power? '' (1788a) . Pondering the effectiveness of the Bill of Rights, Madison concluded ''in a certain form and to a certain extent, such a provision was neither improper nor altogether useless.'' (1789).
Madison was aware that constitutional provisions and protections often did not produce the results they were intended to produce. Yet his rhetorical question about the separation of powers prefaces his argument for the need to have each department of government exercise ''a constitutional controul over the others,'' and his chicken soup attitude toward the Bill of Rights-''it won't hurt''-reflected his belief that the body of the constitution as drafted already provided as effective a set of barriers against government abuse of liberty as ''parchment'' could provide.
This article seeks to discover whether there may be reason for Madison's ultimate confidence in constitutional protections, although the unavailability of the data to test alternative hypotheses leaves that conclusion tentative. Taken cumulatively and allowed to work their effects over a reasonable period of time, the mere parchment barriers of constitutional provisions associate with substantial decreases in the extent to which nations engage in abuse of the most fundamental of their citizens' rights. Since it may be easier to change constitutions than to build effective democracy, to create massive amounts of new wealth, or to defuse deeply ingrained conflicts, we believe these findings have potential policy as well as scientific importance. 
Constitutional Change and Human Rights Protection
The fall of the Soviet Union and the spread of constitutional democracies around the world followed upon a period of near-global acceptance of international human rights standards that legally bind states. By the end of the last century, constitutions had become ''the only fixture of modern government to be universally accepted'' (Blaustein 1993, 70-71 ; see also Howard 1991) and more than 100 constitutions contained formal bills of rights (Blaustein 1993) .
Some observers of these changes (Ackermann 1989; Elster 1993; Finer et al. 1995) , like Madison the constitutionalist, are confident that the proliferation of formal-legal rights protections will improve the actual state of human rights in the countries adopting them. The institutionalization of the rule of law and the building of an independent judiciary were also direct goals of United States democracy assistance (see Talbott 1998) . These optimists presume that regimes will be less willing to abuse rights that are clearly and publicly promised in a legally binding document (Rosenthal 1990, 401) . Such promises may pressure a regime to give in to demands for fundamental protections (see Elster 1993; Finer et al. 1995) . As Madison put it, ''political truths declared in that solemn manner . . . become incorporated with the national sentiment, and counteract the impulses of interest and passion'' (1788b).
Others, like Madison the skeptic, question the effectiveness of formal mechanisms. They know that constitutions may provide more window dressing than substantive protection for human rights (Howard 1991, 3) . Furthermore, constitutions may also limit rights or state that they must not harm the nation's interests or the public good (Ludwikowski 1996, 227) .
Analysts have made few attempts to assess systematically whether Madison the constitutionalist or Madison the skeptic is correct. While constitutional experts have been advising newly independent states and emerging democracies on how to provide constitutional protections to their citizens, there has been very little empirical analysis that would support their advice or facilitate the creation of effective constitutions.
What We Analyze and What
We Do Not Analyze ''Is the Law a Mere Parchment Barrier to Human Rights Abuse?'' has been answered mostly in prescriptive or anecdotal accounts. We seek to provide an answer based on systematic analysis of a large quantity of relevant data. In developing that answer, we investigate whether formal constitutional provisions promote actual protection of the human right to personal integrity. Specifically, we examine the impact on integrity rights of three types of constitutional provisions: (1) provisions for specific individual freedoms; (2) provisions for an independent judiciary (arguably necessary to fully implement the constitutional protection of rights); and (3) states of emergency provisions, which may facilitate or curb a regime's proclivity to abuse rights. We want to emphasize what we are and are not analyzing, and what inferences we are and are not able to support. First, we stress that our analysis is focused on a simple, but important, question: if nations adopt constitutional provisions to protect rights, to promote judicial independence, and regulate states of emergency, do they repress integrity rights less? We are able to measure only whether nations have set up Madison's parchment barriers. We currently lack the data to measure systematically whether citizen rights are protected, judges are independent, and states of emergency are regulated as the constitution says they should be.
Given an affirmative answer to our question, we can infer that if nations do adopt formal provisions protecting rights, promoting judicial independence, and regulating states of emergency, they repress their 1 Our judgment is relative. We do not imply that writing and winning adoption of a new constitution is in fact ''easy.'' Constitutional creation and adoption is likely to be a contentious, highly political process. Our conclusion expands this point. citizens less. We cannot infer for certain that it is the adoption of the constitutional provisions that causes the reduction in repression. Perhaps governments adopt constitutional protections when they are already predisposed to enforce them and not to abuse personal integrity. Since we (and everyone else, so far as we are aware) lack indicators of governmental predispositions, we are not, ultimately, in a position to resolve this causal conundrum. Insofar as data allow, however, we do postulate and analyze alternative model specifications designed to eradicate the link between constitutional provisions and respect for human rights.
Integrity Rights Theory and Constitutional Provisions
Our purpose is to investigate, as rigorously as possible, the ability of constitutional rights protections, judicial independence provisions, and state of emergency regulations to ameliorate state abuse of personal integrity-the right not to be imprisoned, tortured, killed, or made to disappear either arbitrarily or because of your political affiliations or convictions.
Constitutional Provisions
What was long regarded as an American peculiarity, a written constitution with a bill of fundamental rights, protected by an independent judiciary, especially one empowered with judicial review, today is seen as a global model of democratization or is seen as part of the ''script of modernity like presidencies and legislatures'' as Ginsburg notes (2003, 26) . Waldron (1998) further notes that newly independent or democratizing countries ''turn almost instinctively to some version of this constitutional arrangement'' (335). Indeed, as Howard (1991) suggests, almost every country in the world has adopted some document called a constitution, and as Blaustein concludes, constitutions have become ''the only fixture of modern government to be universally accepted '' (1993, 70-71) . As we noted above, for many this trend represents substantial progress in the democratic transition away from authoritarian regimes and engenders considerable potential for human rights protection (e.g. , Rosenthal 1990; Elster 1993 and Finer et al. 1995; Epp 1998; Teitel 2000) . This optimism in constitutionalism may stem from the general belief that the best way to safeguard individual freedoms is through ''the enumeration of rights and their protection by the judiciary'' (Rosenthal 1990, 401) . Presumably regimes would be less willing to abuse rights that are clearly and publicly promised to their citizens in a legally binding document and that are supported by constitutional mechanisms, such as an independent judiciary. But as we have noted in our discussion above, this optimism is countered by skeptics who argue that the effects of these documents ''are commonly exaggerated'' or in fact may be ''shams'' (see Epp 1998, 13) and mere window dressing (Howard 1991, 3) .
Empirical Studies
Ultimately, the effect of formal provisions of law on state human rights behaviors remains an empirical question, one that political scientists have only begun to explore in systematic analyses. Early analyses (BoliBennett 1976; Pritchard 1986) found evidence that would support our skeptics-not only were constitutional provisions not associated with improved rights behavior, the associations were in the opposite direction. However, these early studies relied on simple bivariate analyses of the association between constitutions and various rights measures and tended to be limited to a single year. The generalizability of their results is thus limited, and, more importantly our confidence in their conclusions is severely limited as we know many potentially confounding factors contribute to states human rights practices. Subsequent analyses grew in rigor and sophistication. Blasi and Cingranelli (1996) moved our attention beyond constitutional provisions that were direct promises of freedoms and rights to institutional provisions expected to facilitate the provision of human rights through an independent judiciary. They constructed a constitutional index of judicial independence that was associated with actual judicial independence and found that, in turn, judicial independence was associated with human rights protection. While their study was somewhat restricted in the number of countries examined, it provided the first evidence of at least a weak effect of constitutional provisions on respect for human rights. Davenport (1996) moved us further along by presenting a rigorous and comprehensive analysis of government application of ''negative sanctions'' (''limitation of the media and political restrictions upon individual citizens and political parties''; Taylor and Jodice 1983) for 39 countries over a 35-year period (1948-82) and bringing additional components of constitutionalism into his analyses. He examined constitutional provisions for and limitation of fundamental rights as well emergency rule clauses. Only three of Davenport's 14 constitutional provisions had statistically significant effects. He found that the constitutional promise of freedom of press reduced, (2) constitutional restriction of the press increased, and 3) state of emergency clauses reduced negative sanctions. Several other provisions appeared to increase sanctions, but their coefficients did not achieve statistical significance.
Davenport's analysis demonstrated that constitutional provisions have some effect on rights practice as the constitutional optimists would expect, but its contribution to answering our title question is limited. As Davenport notes, his sample is limited and not representative of the world. In addition, his dependent variable taps a quite different strain of state human right behavior than we analyze in this article. Finally, his time period ends in 1982, well before the development of constitutions in the Third Wave of democratization and the postcommunist era. Keith (2002) sought to build upon the work of Blasi and Cingranelli and Davenport by examining across the global set of countries for a 20-year period the impact of 10 constitutional provisions that ranged from individual freedoms such as freedom of speech and press to trial related provisions and the ban against torture. She too found less of an effect than the optimists would hope for, finding that only provisions for public and fair trials made a difference in states' level of personal integrity abuse.
The theoretical and empirical literature suggests that the constitutional provisions that are most relevant to protecting citizens against serious repression fall into three related general categories: protections of individual freedoms and rights, promotion of judicial independence, and regulations of arbitrary rule during states of emergency. To date no empirical study has examined all three categories simultaneously and only one category has been examined across a global set of countries for a significant period of time.
The Model
Measuring the Dependent Variable, State
Terror (Personal Integrity Abuse)
We begin the explication of our model by operationalizing the dependent variable, ''state terror,'' the abuse of the right to personal integrity: political imprisonment, torture, disappearances, and killings. The indicators of state abuse of personal integrity we use are those originally developed by Stohl and others (Gibney and Dalton 1996; Gibney and Stohl 1988; Poe 1992) (Gastil 1980 ; For examples and country reports for each level see Gibney and Dalton 1996) .
To match the availability of the constitutional provisions indicators we use, we use personal integrity rights (or state terror) indexes for 1976-96. Our dataset includes the global set of countries with a population of 100,000 or more. Each measure contains missing data. In earlier years, AI often did not rate countries with few human rights problems; SD did not rate the United States or some of its close allies. To compensate for the missing data, we followed Poe and Tate (1994) and Poe, Tate, and Keith (1999) by substituting an SD score for a missing AI score, and an AI score for a missing SD score. Had we not made these substitutions, the coverage of the AI and SD data sets would have been so different as to make their comparison problematic. The Effect of Norms Some international relations scholars argue that international norms drive state human rights behavior. As more and more states commit to new rights, others also feel increasing pressure to commit to these norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) . A state adopts international norms because accepts that doing so is appropriate for legitimate statehood (Meyer et al. 1997 ) or because of rewards or punishments it expects to reap or avoid by adopting such norms (Simmons 2000) . The pressure to adhere to international norms might represent an alternative explanation both for why states adopt constitutional provisions intended to protect human rights and why they refrain from human rights abuse. If pressure from international human rights norms drives state human rights behaviors, evidence for the potential impact of constitutional provisions that does not take the effect of adherence to norms into account could be spurious.
As Goodliffe and Hawkins note, ''operationalizing norms is a tricky business . . . norms are difficult to identify and their influence is hard to track '' (2006, 361) . Nevertheless, they argue that norms lead states to commit to international rights treaties. Relying on Simmons' (2000) work, they create an annual measure of the average commitment to the United Nations Convention against Torture (UNCT) at the level of both global and regional communities. Their empirical examination finds evidence that adherence to regional and global norms in support of the UNCT increases a state's likelihood of joining the Convention early: adherence to existing global and community norms affects individual national formal commitments to refrain from torture.
To operationalize the effect of the pressure of international norms, we follow Goodliffe and Hawkins (2006) and Simmons (2000) , measuring global and regional commitments to a relevant international treaty, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 4 We operationalize the strength of global and regional norms pressuring for commitment to the ICCPR using a 0-2 scale, where 0 is no action, 1 is signature, and 2 is ratification or accession. We then created an annual measure of the average commitment scores of the global set of countries and an annual measure of the average commitment scores for each geographical region.
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Since our focus is on formal-legal provisions that are intended to protect the civil and political rights at the heart of constitutional liberalism, we must be careful to operationalize democracy so that it does not overlap too much with these rights. Some scholars (Schmitter 1992; Zakaria 1997 ) distinguish liberalism from democracy, arguing that the essence of democracy is rule of the people, that constitutional liberalism ''is not about the procedures of selecting government, but . . . seeks to protect an individual's autonomy and dignity against coercion,'' and pointing to the rising number of democracies that do not practice constitutional liberalism but rather are ''illiberal democracies'' (Zakaria 1997) . We agree with Zakaria. But even if we did not, this analysis would be a pointless exercise if we did not take care to differentiate our measures of democracy from our measures of constitutional provisions. Examining measures of democracy that are available for most of the countries and years we analyze, we conclude that those in the Polity data sets allow us to best achieve the conceptual separation we desire, because they focus on the electoral process of the country's executive. The specific measures we use in this analysis are drawn from the Polity 98 data set (Marshall and Jaggers 2001 for current version, Polity IV). Statistically, it is clear that our individual constitutional protections measures and the Polity indicator of democracy are far from identical. Simple correlations for the relationships between the protections we discuss below and the Polity democracy scores ranged from .12 to .33. Following Poe and Tate (1994) , we validate our results by employing a second measure of political democracy, the Freedom House (FH) Political Rights Index that allows us to analyze a maximum-sized set of countries. The Political Rights Index is definitionally and empirically distinct from our constitutional protections: the correlation coefficients for the individual constitutional protections and political rights ranged from .17 to .41.
Constitutional Provisions
The sections of constitutions that are most relevant to protecting citizens against serious repression fall into three general categories: protections of individual freedoms and rights, promotion of judicial independence, and regulations of arbitrary rule during states of emergency.
Individual Freedoms and Rights
We expect two types of constitutional protections to affect personal integrity abuse: (1) the individual freedoms associated with constitutional liberalism: freedom of speech, assembly, association, religion, and press; and (2) the key due process protections that directly relate to personal integrity abuse, the rights to habeas corpus, to protection against arbitrary arrest, the prohibition against torture or cruel and unusual punishment, and the right to a fair and public trial. Provisions for individual freedoms are intended to allow people to openly criticize and perhaps challenge a regime and the status quo (Poe and Tate 1994, 123-24) . Due process provisions should protect against arbitrary government actions against personal integrity. Observance of habeas corpus rights would preclude disappearances and limit political imprisonment. Providing a fair and public trial makes it more difficult to convict people for political reasons and gives the press and public opinion a better chance to curb repressive behavior. The ban on torture, when practiced, would directly eliminate one form of personal integrity abuse and decrease extrajudicial killings. These constitutional protections recognize human rights modeled after the universally accepted United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR) and the broadly accepted ICCPR. We hypothesize that constitutional provisions for both individual freedoms and due process rights will reduce personal integrity abuse.
While providing for rights and freedoms, many constitutions limit the very freedoms they promise to protect, specifying that freedoms be exercised within the boundaries of statutory law or linking bills of rights with a list of duties that limit the rights. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights holds that clearly defining limitations on constitutional rights promises is better than leaving the question of acceptable restrictions open to interpretation (Despouy 1985) .
An alternative view argues that giving a regime any opening to suspend constitutionally provided rights and freedoms offers it a cover of legitimacy to erode human rights beyond the acceptable suspensions specified in the constitution (see Frühling 1993; Grossman 1990 ; International Commission of Jurists [ICJ] 1983; and the empirical results of Davenport 1996 and . We are persuaded by this view and hypothesize that specified limits on the exercise of individual rights and freedoms will increase personal integrity abuse.
We operationalize the extent to which constitutions provides for individual rights and freedoms by coding the presence of 10 fundamental rights and liberties in the text of national constitutions for each year in the period 1976-96: freedoms of (1) speech, (2) association, (3) assembly, (4) religion, and (5) press, and rights to (6) strike, (7) the writ of habeas corpus, (8) a public trial, (9) a fair trail, and (10) be free from torture or cruel and usual punishment. We coded each as (2) explicitly mentioned in the constitution, (1) explicitly mentioned but with (an) exception(s) or qualification(s), such as a public interest clause, or (0) not mentioned in the constitution.
The data sources for our constitutional variables are Blaustein's Constitutions of the World (1993) and Flanz's (1997) Constitutions of Countries of the World, both updated annually.
An Independent Judiciary
Many commentators have stressed the potential importance of an independent judiciary in protecting human rights (see Ackermann 1989; Rosenthal 1990) . A truly independent judiciary should be able to withstand incursions upon rights because (1) the courts' power and fiscal well-being are protected, (2) the courts have some ability to review the actions of other agencies of government, and (3) the judges' jobs are constitutionally protected. Standards for achieving an independent judiciary are offered in United Nations (1985) and Cumaraswamy (1995) .
We assessed the efforts of the world's constitution makers to establish an independent judiciary by coding the presence of eight indicators: is the law a mere parchment barrier to human rights abuse5) Fiscal Autonomy. The courts are fiscally autonomous. The salaries of judges and/or their annual budgets are protected from reduction by the other branches. 6) Separation of Powers. Courts are housed in a separate branch from executive or legislature. 7) Enumerated Qualifications. Selection/advancement of judges based on merit qualifications. 8) Hierarchical system. Courts are structured in multiple layers with the highest level court exercising final control/review of lower court decisions.
Authorities disagree as to whether judicial review is a power that contributes to an independent judiciary or whether an independent judiciary is a necessary component for its real exercise (Blasi and Cingranelli 1996 vs. Rosenthal 1990) . Following Blasi and Cingranelli (1996) , we include judicial review among our judicial independence indicators, since it has been strongly argued to be a substantial factor in the protection of human rights, particularly during periods of crisis or instability (see Ackermann 1989; Chowdhury 1989; ICJ 1983) , despite our intuition that it is a consequence, rather than a component of judicial independence:
9) Judicial Review. Courts exercise judicial/constitutional review of legislature and executive.
We hypothesize that constitutional guarantees of an independent judiciary will increase respect for personal integrity. We originally coded the presence in the constitutions of each of these components promoting judicial independence as 2 5 constitution provides for it fully and explicitly, 1 5 constitution provides for it somewhat or provides for it vaguely, but not fully, 0 5 constitution does not provide for it. In addition, ''No exceptional courts'' (4 above) was coded 21 for constitutions that specifically allowed civilians to be tried in military courts or explicitly allowed the formation of exceptional courts and ''Judicial review'' (8 above) was coded 21 for constitutions that gave the power of constitutional review to another branch of government. Preliminary diagnostic data analyses of the properties of these variables led us to collapse codes 1 and 2 for each variable. This meant that the measures used in this analysis for Guaranteed Terms, Decisions Final, Exclusive Authority, Fiscal Autonomy, Separation of Powers, Enumerated Qualifications, and Hierarchical system, were coded as 0,1 dichotomies, while No Exceptional or Military Courts and Judicial Review were coded as -1,0,1 trichotomies.
States of Emergency
Analysts have tried hard to find appropriate legal standards and safeguards to protect human rights during the states of emergency that often result when the existence or continuation in power of regimes are (perceived to be) threatened (see Cea 1987; Chowdhury 1989; Frühling 1993; Grossman 1990 ). The ICJ argues (1983) that constitutions should clearly specify the conditions under which states of emergency may be declared and exercised so that (1) regimes who resort to emergency clauses in good faith will know in advance the extent and limit of their emergency powers, and (2) regimes not disposed to respect the limits of their authority may be judged according to the extent to which they live up to these specific rules.
The commission recommends that constitutions specify that emergency measures may not affect rights recognized as nonderogable in international law and spell out the effects of states of emergency on the rights of citizens and the powers of the branches of government. The Commission recommends further that the constitution enumerate and define situations that justify departure from the normal legal order and establish a procedure for declaring a state of emergency that (1) gives primary responsibility to the legislature, (2) specifies the duration of the emergency, and (3) periodically reviews the need for its continuation (1983, (32) (33) (34) .
A quite similar set of recommendations for regulating states of emergency (International Law Association's Paris Minimum Standards reported in Chowdhury 1989) adds that constitutions should require that states of emergency be extendable only with the legislature's approval, and that the legislature may not be dissolved during the emergency.
Based on these international recommendations, our indicators of constitutional regulation of states of emergency or national crisis are: 1) Legislative Declaration. Procedure for declaring a state of emergency gives primary responsibility to the legislature: 2 5 legislative branch has explicit responsibility for declaring the emergency, 1 5 executive-declared emergency must be explicitly confirmed by legislature, 0 5 no mention of who has the power to declare such an emergency, and 21 5 executive power to declare emergency is explicit with no mention of a role for legislatures or courts. 2) Cannot Dissolve Legislature. During an emergency, 2 5 the legislature may not be dissolved or ''meets by right''; 1 5 there is a vague provision for legislature meeting, but no prohibition against dissolution; 0 5 there is no mention of dissolving legislature; and 21 5 there is automatic suspension or explicit executive power to suspend legislature. 3) Duration Limited. During an emergency, 2 5 the duration of the emergency is limited; extension requires legislative approval; 1 5 the duration is limited/legislative approval of extension is required, but not both; 0 5 no mention of duration or extension process. 4) Nonderogable Rights. For a state of emergency, 1 5 constitution lists nonderogable rights or states that certain rights/freedoms cannot be revoked, and 0 5 otherwise.
A logical hypothesis is that the more closely the constitutional provisions for states of emergency follow the international standards, the less likely the regime will be to abuse personal integrity rights. However, just as there have been skeptics who fear that specifying the conditions under which individual rights and freedoms can be derogated may promote human rights abuse, so there are pessimists who worry that specifying conditions regulating states of emergency may be counterproductive. Grossman showed that, while most Latin American constitutions have emergency clauses that supposedly apply in relatively restricted circumstances, in periods of emergency rule, rights were often broadly suspended; that the constitutional emergency provisions provided a ''rationalization for deprivation of human liberties' ' (1990, 188; see also Cea 1987, 665; Frühling 1993) . This research suggests a strong expectation for an alternative hypothesis for ''Duration limited'' and ''Nonderogable rights'': that clauses intended to limit human rights abuse during a crisis frequently may have the opposite effect, and that a list of individual freedoms and rights that may not be derogated during an emergency may imply that some other rights may justifiably be denied. Such clauses may provide regimes with a cover of legitimacy for their denial of human rights, even those that are nonderogable, and even at times outside of states of emergency. Similarly, provisions that set a time limit on and require renewals of states of emergency may have the unintended consequence of encouraging their extension. Because provisions setting limits on states of emergencies and specifying nonderogable rights may be expected either to decrease or to increase personal integrity abuse, we use a two-tailed measure of statistical significance to test their effects. We strongly expect the other provisions-legislative involvement in the declaration of and nondissolution of the legislature during a state of emergency-to decrease repression and evaluate their effects using a onetailed test.
Constitutional Provisions and State Terror: Estimating Contemporaneous Effects
Our approach is to analyze-for as many nations as possible across as long a time span as possible-the relationships between our measures of formal constitutional provisions and important measures of personal integrity rights abuse. To support the analysis, we have built a pooled cross-sectional data set that records (1) appropriate information about constitutional provisions protecting rights, promoting judicial independence, and regulating states of emergency, (2) indicators of repression of personal integrity rights, and (3) other relevant phenomena for each year in the period 1976-96 for 154 to 178 nation-states, depending upon the year. We use this data set to build a statistical model to assess the relationships implied by our research questions.
Results
We must estimate the appropriate coefficients for the prediction of state terror (abuse of personal integrity rights) from our sets of measures of individual freedoms and rights, states of emergency, and judicial independence, controlling for the variables that previous research indicates are necessary for a properly specified equation. We use Ordinary Least Squares regression. 5 However, to cope with the unreliability of statistical inference that can result from the heteroskedacity and autocorrelation that plague pooled cross-sectional time series designs like ours, we follow the recommendations of Beck and Katz (1995) and employ panel-corrected (robust) standard errors to correct for the former and a lagged dependent variable 5 Our dependent variable is ordinal. Why do we report OLS analyses, rather than analyses carried out using a technique like ordered logit or probit? We have several reasons. We discuss these reasons based on extensive analyses in Appendix B (available on request). Here we simply note that the similarity of ordered logit results to OLS models, the impossibility of projecting ordered logit coefficients over time in an interpretable fashion, an optimal scoring transformations analysis of the ordinal state terror measure (and analyses of the transformed dependent variables), and especially the desirability of comparing our results with previous comprehensive work all suggest that using OLS methods is appropriate and proper.
to compensate for the latter. The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable not only corrects a statistical difficulty; it also has a theoretical justification because it represents history: the tendency of regimes to use past decisions to shape present decisions. We used STATA 9.2 to perform the analyses.
Before including them in the equation, we analyzed the multicollinearity among our independent variables. We found that four of the constitutional provisions were too highly correlated for all to be included individually in the equation. To compensate for their multicollinearity, we combined the freedoms of speech, association, assembly, and religion into an additive ''Four Freedoms Index'' (see Appendix C, available on request, for multicollinearity details).
To enhance the robustness of our analysis and maximize confidence in our results, we estimated our basic prediction equation four times, once for each combination of our two measures of state terror and democracy. 6 The coefficients produced for these four equations are reported in Table 1 . They show that nine of the 23 constitutional provisions were associated with substantively and statistically significant relationships in hypothesized directions in at least one version of our prediction equation; eight were statistically significant in two to four versions.
Individual Freedoms and Rights
The Four Freedoms index produced small coefficients (# 2.010) in the expected direction in all four models, but none of the coefficients was statistically significant. This lack of statistical and substantive significance suggests that the four freedoms will be the foundation of any set of rights adopted by a nation, so nearly universal that they are standard symbols in the newly created constitutions of the world, incapable of discriminating regime intentions or actions.
Two individual rights provisions, the requirements that trials be public and fair, have statistically significant coefficients across all four equations. The fair trial provision produces the largest coefficients: 2.067 and 2.075 in the two equations using SD State Terror indicators and 2.108 and 2.116 in the equation using AI measures. The maximum (2 point) change from no constitutional protection to full protection for fair trials produces a decrease of .14 to .24 in the 5-point state terror indexes. The coefficients for the public trial provision are smaller than those for fair trial, ranging from 2.042 to 2.078 across the four equations. A maximum (2 point) change in public trial protections produces a decrease of .08 to .16 in personal integrity abuse.
The provision for the right to strike produces somewhat smaller coefficients (2.037 and 2.045) that are significant in the two SD equations. The remaining individual freedoms measures are not associated with a statistically significant coefficient in any equation.
Some of the early analyses of the impact of constitutional provisions on various measures of human rights abuse found it to be negative. Boli-Bennett (1976) and Pritchard (1986) both found negative effects on rights, and even Davenport's analysis reports some relationships that are in the wrong direction, although, the coefficients do not reach a sufficient level statistical significance had he tested with no predicted direction and a two-tailed test. This problematic finding surfaces again with three individual rights measures, the ban against torture, provision for the writ of habeas corpus, and, to a lesser extent, freedom of the press. Each of these measures produces one or more coefficients that are signed in the unexpected direction, given our hypotheses.
7 Overall, these somewhat disappointing results for the individual freedoms and rights parallel 6 This is only one significant tactic we have used to examine the robustness of our results. In addition to replicating the basic model using four different specifications for operationalizations of repression and democracy, we also conducted several other analyses that demonstrate the robustness of our findings: 1) First, as noted above, we replicated the four basic model specifications using ordered probit analysis, instead of OLS, with no important differences in findings. 2) Second, we replicated the basic analyses using the composite personal integrity abuse measure provided by Cingranelli and Richards (2008) in their CIRI dataset. Because their measure is only available beginning in 1980, this analysis reduced our available N by some 20%. Nevertheless, the CIRI analysis produced no significant differences in results. 3) Finally, we conducted several analyses replicating the basic analysis but substituting several factor-analysis-derived composite indices for subgroups of constitutional rights/provisions. For example, we created ''Four Freedoms'' and ''Five Freedoms'' indexes, three different ''Judicial Independence'' indexes, and two different indexes of ''Emergency Rule'' provisions in place of sets of individual independent variables that were well-measured by the derived factors. This analysis is itself much too elaborate and complicated to explore further here, and, indeed, we have prepared for publication a manuscript that reports on it in another context (Tate and Keith 2008) . Suffice it to say at this point, that the findings using the composite indices give us no reason for believing that the basic findings reported in Table 1 are anything less than robust.
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Had we not stated our expectations and instead used two-tailed tests of significance: freedom of press in the two AI State Terror equations; torture in the two FH equations; habeas corpus in the SD/ Polity 98 equation, would have achieved significance (at p # .05).
those of earlier analyses: Davenport (1996) found only three of 14 provisions to have an impact on state repression, and both Boli-Bennett (1976) and Pritchard (1986) found constitutional provisions to have the opposite effect of what was predicted.
An Independent Judiciary
Three of the judicial independence provisions produce statistically significant coefficients in at least two of the equations. The provision that makes judges' decisions final produces statistically significant coefficients in all four models (2.055 and 2.053 in the SD equations and 2.085 and 2.084 in the AI equations). The coefficients for the ban against exceptional and military courts are statistically significant in both AI equations (2.060 and 2.071) and in one SD equation (2.025). The provision that gives judges exclusive authority to decide on their own competence produces coefficients (2.055 and 2.062) that are statistically significant (at p # .10) in the two SD equations. A maximum change from a constitution that explicitly allows exceptional courts to a constitution that specifies the ban against these courts would decrease the predicted level of personal integrity abuse by 2.044 or 2.142, depending on the equation selected. None of the remaining provisions for judicial independence are statistically significant in any equation and six of the nine are not signed in the expected direction.
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That judicial review not only fails to demonstrate a negative impact but in fact exhibits a positive relationship with repression in two equations is contra-hypothesis. This ''nonfinding'' may indicate that judicial review should not be regarded as a component of judicial independence. It may also support the view that judges are political actors who possess the same values and pursue the same public goals as other state actors. The circumstances that lead regimes to repress may lead judges to sanction repressive behavior, especially in issues of national security. Even if judges do not wish to support crisis ruler(s), the situations they face and the options available to the rulers may make it very difficult for them to act effectively to protect rights (Tate 1993) . Judicial review and independence are typically weakened during states of emergency, perhaps by constitutional provisions that limit their power, or perhaps, as Chowdhury (1989, 131) suggests, by the exercise of judicial restraint or adoption of a hands-off policy.
States of Emergency
In contrast to individual rights and freedoms and judicial independence, the coefficients for the four constitutional provisions related to states of emergencies are statistically and substantively significant in most of the prediction equations. Requiring legislative declaration of states of emergency is statistically significant in all four equations with values of 2.028 and .026 (both at p # .01) in the Amnesty equations and values of 2.021 and .017 (both at p # .10) in the SD equations. Banning dissolution of the legislature during a state of emergency is significant in three of the four equations with values of 2.041, 2.067 (both at p # .01), and 2.053 (p # .05).
The reader will recall that there is controversy over the effects of the other two state of emergency provisions whose impacts we assess. Proponents contend that specifying a list of rights that cannot be derogated during the state of emergency and limits on its duration and renewal will protect fundamental rights. Critics argue that such provisions will only encourage state of emergency rulers to abuse rights. Because of this disagreement, we evaluated the impact of the coefficients for these two variables using a two-tailed test of significance.
Setting conditions for extending the duration of states of emergency produces positive coefficients with values ranging from .037 to .055 that are statistically significant (p # .01 in three cases and p # .05 in one cases) in all four personal integrity models. This suggests that time period clauses encourage the regime to renew states of emergency. Specifying a list of nonderogable rights produces statistically significant positive coefficients in both SD prediction equations with values of .098 (p # .01) and .096 (p # .05). These results support the alternative hypothesis that a constitutional provision for the derogation of any right, may in fact lead to the abuse of other rights (including the right to life) that may not legally be derogated.
The Standard Model
The ''standard model'' of state terror works as expected in our data: eight of the nine control variables perform in our equations as they have in previous analyses of personal integrity abuse; thus we shall not discuss them here. The exception is British colonial experience. When controlling for our constitutional provisions, British colonial experience no longer exhibits any statistically significant effects. The impact it had in previous studies was likely due to the British influence on constitution writing, as suggested by scholars who have written about colonial heritages (see Moderne 1990, 322-27, for example) . While coding the constitutional provisions, it was easy for us to observe a basic template upon which former British colonies, as newly independent states, based their constitutions.
Norms
Only one of the eight coefficients for the two norms variables is signed in the right direction: global norms in the AI/FH equation. It does not achieve an 8 Had we not stated our expectations and instead used two-tailed tests (at p # .05), fiscal autonomy would have been significant in all equations and judicial review in the AI equations. acceptable level of statistical significance. All the other coefficients are signed in an unexpected direction. The coefficients for regional norms would have achieved statistical significance (at p # .05) in all four equations had we used two-tailed tests of statistical significance, as the global norms coefficients would have in the SD equations. Whatever the effects of norms in other analytical contexts, they do not contribute to the reduction of personal integrity abuse, controlling for the effects of the standard model and for constitutional provisions.
Lagged Dependent Variable
Not surprisingly, the lagged dependent variable had a powerful influence. A 1-point increase in last year's state terror index is associated with a .609 to .620 increase in this year's predicted record of personal integrity abuse, depending on the measures of state terror and democracy included in the equations. That repression tends to beget repression is not surprising. We shall return to the issue of the influence of history after summarizing the contemporaneous effects on state terror depicted in our prediction equations.
Assessing the Contemporaneous Effects
Nine of the 23 constitutional provisions we included in our equations had effects that were statistically too large to have occurred by chance. But it is not the statistical, but the substantive, significance of these effects that matters. The substantive questions are ''just how much can we expect a state's personal integrity repression score to increase or decrease in a specific year, given one unit changes in its scores on particular constitutional provisions?'' The answers, given by the regression coefficients, are not immediately obvious, given the differences in the scales used to represent the constitutional provisions and control variables.
Is an expected decrease of 2.067 to 2.116 as a result of adding a qualified fair trial provision to a constitution a little, or a lot? A change of .067 to .116 is only about a 1 to 2% change on a scale that runs 1 to 5. One might be tempted to say that it is only a little, especially compared to the lagged dependent variable or the major variables in the standard model. But one must remember that the changes represented in Table 1 are net changes that occur after all the other variables in the equation have had their effects. One should also remember that the constitutional provisions are likely to be adopted in bundles, not one at a time, so that a more informative way to examine their effects might be to combine them. The rationale for combining the statistically significant constitutional provisions in this analysis might be understood through a thought experiment in which groups of constitution makers adopt at a particular point in time bundles of constitutional changes that, intelligently or fortuitously, include the provisions that we have found to have significant desirable effects in decreasing integrity rights abuse. Through foresight or luck they also happen not to adopt any provisions that might increase rights abuse (see the ''Caveats'' discussion below) or else adopt other provisions that have no effect, either positive or negative, on rights abuse.
Combining and comparing effects for the statistically significant constitutional provisions, control variables, and lagged dependent variable reveals that:
d Focusing on the combined constitutional provisions that had a statistically significant effect in one or more of the prediction equations, a one unit change in the direction that would decrease state terror on each constitutional provision would lead to an expected contemporaneous decrease in the state terror index of between 2.315 to 2.546, from about three-eighths to just over one-half a point, seven to 11%. A similar change on each of the seven variables in the standard model would lead to an expected contemporaneous decrease in the state terror index of 2.823 to 21.077, or from about ninetenths to about 1 point, 18 to 21%. Finally, a one-unit decrease in state terror last year would lead to an expected decrease in current state terror of 2.609 to 2.620, from about six-tenths to five-eighths of a point, 12 to 13%.
The combined constitutional provisions have less important effects on the repression of personal integrity rights than the combined independent variables or the lagged dependent variable included in the standard model. Do they represent useful additions to this model? For perspective, we ask ourselves: would not most analysts and policy makers agree that a one-year change of 7 to 11% in population, GNP per capita, or democracy was important? We think so, and we think the same can be said for a 7 to 11% increase or decrease in the state terror index associated with the constitutional provisions.
But this is not the end of our story of the effects of constitutional provisions on repression. The process 9
These numbers are ranges of the sums of the values of the coefficients for the variables referred to. that our equations model is not one that runs out in a single year. Because this year's scores are powerfully affected by last year's scores, and because last year's scores were in turn affected by the previous year's constitutional provisions and standard model variables scores, the process that our equations depict is dynamic: it can take years for the full effects of changes that occur this year to work themselves out. Consequently, we need now to turn to an analysis of the long-term effects of changes in constitutional provisions to assess their full importance.
Constitutional Change and State Terror in the Long Term: Dynamic Effects
Because our prediction equations include a lagged dependent variable, the complete effects of constitutional provisions and standard model variables on state terror are not captured by the regression coefficients for their contemporaneous effects. Indeed, the effects of these independent variables actually continue for several years before they decline, asymptotically, to zero. The long term cumulative effect of a specific independent variable can be calculated using: To illustrate the long-term potential impacts of changes in the constitutional provisions and control variables, we calculated the cumulative effects over a ten-year period (Year t to Year t+10 ) of substantial changes in each of the independent variables that achieved statistical significance in one or more of our prediction equations. Figure 1 plots the effects of these substantial changes 10 for the combined constitutional provisions and the combined standard model variables that achieved statistical significance in the AI/Polity 98 equation.
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Before tackling Figure 1 , readers need to understand two assumptions that governed its construction. First, we defined the ''substantial'' changes it models as maximum changes in the independent variables from year t21 to year t , except for Economic Development (measured as GNP per capita) and Population. A substantial change in Civil or International War was a change from being involved in a civil or international war, to being at peace; a change in Democracy was a change from ''least democracy'' to ''most democracy,'' a change in Cannot Dissolve Legislature was a change from a constitution without a provision to prohibit the executive from dissolving the legislature during a state of emergency, to a constitution that has such a provision; and so on. That such changes can occur in a single year seems entirely plausible to us.
The same logic does not seem to apply to changes in GNP per capita and Population. If we restrict ourselves to the real world ranges they exhibit, it does not seem plausible to assume that any country could change from being the poorest to the richest, or from being the least populous to the most populous nation in a single year. Consequently, we assume that a substantial change in GNP per capita is $20,000 dollars, and a substantial change in population is a similarly large change of 10,000,000 people (see Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999) .
Second, in calculating Figure 1 and to keep the graph simple, we summed the statistically significant effects of the combined constitutional provisions (Public Trial, Fair Trial, Decisions Final, No Exceptional Courts, Legislative Declaration, Limited Duration, Can't Dissolve Legislature) into a single measure, as we did when evaluating their contemporaneous effects. We did so because it allows us to focus on the forest, rather than the trees; to assess the overall impact of efforts to write constitutions that will protect human rights and to compare them with the collective effects of other important variables. The fact is that nations typically do not adopt one or another of these constitutional provisions in isolation from others. They adopt them in clusters or bundles. When we bundle them for purposes of assessing their long term effects, we are reflecting reality. For effective comparison, we also combined the effects of the significant standard model variables (Civil War, International War, Democracy, GNP pc [1000s], logged Population).
One conclusion emerges forcefully from Figure 1 : at least in the abstract, constitutional provisions may represent mere parchment barriers, but they are anything but paper tigers in their long term potential to reduce repression of state terror. After 10 years, the projected effect of adopting all the constitutional provisions modeled in Figure 1 would be to decrease a nation's repression score by 2.5 points on the 5-point scale.
12 Such a change could move a nation from being one in which state terror affects the whole population to one in which political imprisonment affects only a few persons and torture and beatings are rare, or from one in which political imprisonment affects large numbers of the politically active population and political murders may be common, to one where the rule of law is secure.
Some examples using real data may make the meaning of the projections in Figure 1 more understandable. Uganda and Chad made major constitutional changes in 1996; Nicaragua did the same in 1987. In these years, each country was rated as a ''4,'' the next to most repressive category, on the basis of its profile in the AI reports. Among the multiple constitutional provisions Uganda and Chad adopted in 1996 were provisions for the exclusive authority of judges and for legislative declaration, limited duration of states of emergency, and a list of nonderogable rights. Uganda also adopted provisions for public and fair trials. Chad also adopted provisions guaranteeing freedom to strike and providing that judicial decisions were final. In 1987, Nicaragua adopted constitutional language providing for the right to strike, public trials, the exclusive authority of judges, making judicial decisions final, requiring legislative declarations of states of emergency, and listing nonderogable rights.
Nine years after Uganda and Chad adopted the specified new constitutional provisions (in 2005, the last year for which we have data), the coefficients underlying the maximum changes projections in Figure 1 predict decreases in repression levels of 21.87 for Uganda and 21.21 for Chad, other things being equal. In fact, Uganda, which continued to be plagued by its twenty year war in the north, did not see the predicted improved human rights score, but Chad's score decreased from ''4'' to ''2,'' a bit more than predicted. A projection of the effect of Nicaragua's adopted constitutional provisions across 10 years (to 1996) predicts it would decrease its state terror level by 21.19. In fact, Nicaragua's score decreased from ''4'' to ''3,'' about as predicted.
Caveat: The Contra-Hypothesis ''Relationships''
Following classical practices of statistical testing, we have, as existing theory or research allowed, postulated directional hypotheses that required the use of one-tailed tests of statistical significance. In two cases existing evidence could be marshaled to support either positive or negative hypotheses, so we did not predict direction and used two-tailed tests of significance for the effects of duration limits on states of emergency and specifications nonderogable rights during states of emergency. For all our other constitutional provisions we expected that (more of) a specific constitutional provision would decrease state terror and thus produce negative relationships. 
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Our dependent variable has a discrete range of 1-5, so it is possible for the sum of projections based on OLS results to fall outside this range, especially when one is using maximum independent variable scores to calculate the projections, as we are. While out of range projections are unrealistic, the alternatives to OLS are poor choices for this analysis, as we have already noted. A proper response to this problem is to use the predicted scores for purposes of illustrating and comparing the effects of the independent variables, but not to place great confidence in precise scores predicted for individual cases.
A necessary implication of using directional hypotheses and one-tailed tests of significance is that any contra-hypothesis relationship cannot be statistically significant: in the present case, testing the significance of a relationship that is supposed to be negative automatically assigns the positive half of the relevant sampling distribution (the t distribution in this case)-and thus any positive relationship, no matter how strong-to the realm of nonsignificant findings.
Nevertheless, it can be disconcerting to find contra-hypothesis relationships sufficiently strong that they would have been statistically significant, had we begun from a position of ignorance that did not predict the expected direction of relationships for our constitutional provisions and, consequently, used two-tailed tests. As we have noted above, these contrahypotheses relationships are not out of sync with some of the earlier research. Table 1 contains such contrahypothesis relationships for several provisions. Among the Individual Rights and Freedoms indicators, freedom of press would have been positively related to repression in both AI equations, torture in both FH equations, and habeas corpus in the SD/Polity 98 equation, had we not posited an expected negative direction for their relationships in advance. Even in hindsight, it is hard to imagine why freedom of the press, the prohibition of torture, or the guarantee of habeas corpus might exhibit ''significant'' positive relationships with personal integrity abuse.
Among the judicial independence indicators, the provisions establishing fiscal autonomy for the judiciary would have been statistically significant in all four equations and the provision of judicial review in the two AI equations. We have already stated our intuition that judicial review may not an appropriate measure of judicial independence. We speculated that judicial review might demonstrate its unhypothesized positive relationship with state terror because it merely serves as a device through which judges who agree with leaders can strengthen the leader's position by endorsing their actions when they are challenged in courts. The relationship for fiscal autonomy fits in with the nonsignificant but positive relationships between provisions establishing an organizationally independent judiciary and repression, discussed in the next paragraphs.
For judicial independence, the provisions that relate to repression in the expected negative direction (decisions final, exclusive authority, no exceptional courts) all protect the legal decision making authority of regular courts against challenges from other decision makers. In contrast, the six constitutional measures that related in the unexpected positive direction (guaranteed terms, fiscal autonomy, separation of powers, enumerated qualifications, judicial review, and hierarchical system), except for judicial review, are largely concerned with the organization of the courts and qualifications of the judges.
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Hindsight speculation might suggest that these structural features, nominally designed to promote judicial independence, serve as window dressing (truly as parchment barriers) that allow regimes to claim they are establishing independent judiciaries without really doing so. Or, alternatively, perhaps the effort to establish an organizationally professional judiciary actually produces one that is more fully integrated with the bureaucracy and executive, and, thereby, less likely to challenge the actions of its executive counterparts, even when those become repressive. These speculations, indeed the whole set of unexpected relationships we have encountered, bear careful examination in future research specifically designed to test them.
Conclusion
We have sought in this research to provide sound scientific evidence that might extend our understanding of why, in many nations, people are imprisoned, tortured, killed, or made to disappear arbitrarily or because of their political beliefs and actions. As good scientists, we seek empirically grounded knowledge that will help us better understand and explain our social and political world. But we also believe our scientific findings may have implications for improving global protection of human rights. Our findings about the effects of the law-manifested in constitutional provisions designed to protect individual rights and freedoms, to secure an independent judiciary, and to limit or regulate executive actions in states of emergencymay be instructive to policymakers who seek to promote human rights globally. To put it simply: from a practical point of view, pursuing better human rights through constitutional law making may offer potential for improvement in respect for human rights that would be difficult to accomplish through attempting to affect other, less manipulable factors.
Certainly this and other research document that state terror is a product of multiple factors, not just of constitutional provisions. Avoiding involvement in domestic or international war, eschewing military government, or reducing a large population will decrease personal integrity abuse in the long run. So will practicing more democracy and becoming 13 With the possible exception of guaranteed terms.
wealthier. Unfortunately, as we have argued, while policy makers might wish fervently to produce a $20,000 one-year increase in their state's per capita GNP or a one-year ten-million person reduction in its population, these are rather difficult tasks 14 The same may be true for eschewing civil or international war and military government: avoiding these experiences may be easier said than done. Finally, the exhortation ''Practice democracy!'' might well be answered with the reply ''Yes, but how?'' Compared to writing constitutional provisions into law, achieving these goals in the short term is very difficult.
Readers will recognize many limitations to this analysis. Indeed, if we now answer Madison's question, can nations safely ''trust to these parchment barriers against the encroaching spirit of power?'' (Madison 1788a), our answer must be ''Safely? No.'' Nevertheless, at the very least, our research clearly has shown that attempting to protect against abuse of personal integrity by adopting constitutional protections is ''neither improper nor altogether useless'' . 
